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DRISCOLL V. STAPLETON: ANALYZING ELECTION
REGULATIONS IN MONTANA
McKenna Ford*

I. INTRODUCTION
“If we are to have a true participatory democracy, we must ensure that
as many people as possible vote for the people who represent them . . . .”1
In our decentralized electoral system, one without an explicit federal constitutional right to vote, each state has the power to protect—or abuse—democracy according to its own constitutional text.2 In Montana, the right to
vote is afforded constitutional protection principally through Article II, section 13, which states: “All elections shall be free and open, and no power,
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of
the right of suffrage.”3
In 1999, Montana took steps to make its elections freer and more open
when it enacted no-excuse absentee voting, allowing all eligible Montana
electors to cast an absentee ballot on request, without having to provide an
excuse.4 By 2018, more than 73 percent of votes in Montana were cast by
absentee ballots.5 Many were cast with the assistance of third-party ballot
collection organizations who collect and deliver absentee ballots during
election cycles.6 Ballot collection organizations facilitate the delivery of
ballots for citizens who face barriers to voting, including rural citizens living far from election offices and post offices, voters who lack transportation, are immunocompromised, lack access to mail boxes, or require
caregivers when traveling.7
However, in 2017, the Montana Legislature passed the Ballot Interference Prevention Act (“Assistance Ban”) which severely circumscribed ab* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of
2022.
1. 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 1241 (1972) [hereinafter CONSTITUCONVENTION TRANSCRIPT].
2. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 95
(2014).
3. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 13.
4. Frequently Asked Questions, MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, https://perma.cc/E6EB-MYP3
(last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
5. Absentee Turnout 2000–Present, 2018 General Election Turnout, MONTANA SECRETARY OF
STATE available at https://perma.cc/E6Z7-SEXU (last visited May 2, 2021).
6. Driscoll v. Stapleton, 473 P.3d 386, 389 (Mont. 2020).
7. Id.
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sentee ballot collection.8 The Assistance Ban restricted the categories of
individuals authorized to collect and return another voter’s ballot and mandated that an individual could not collect more than six ballots in an election cycle. Along with election officials and postal service workers, the law
defined an authorized individual as a caregiver, family member, household
member, or acquaintance of the voter.9 Further, the Assistance Ban required
authorized collectors to provide contact and address information for each
voter, provide their own contact and address information, and describe their
relationship to each voter.10 The law imposed a $500 fine for each ballot
unlawfully collected.11 Although the Assistance Ban is no longer in effect,
the Montana Legislature recently passed a similar measure, House Bill 530,
signed into law by Governor Greg Gianforte. This law prohibits individuals
from requesting or providing ballot collection services in exchange for a
pecuniary benefit. For each ballot improperly requested, collected, or delivered, the bill imposes a $100 fine.12
The constitutionality of the Assistance Ban was challenged in Driscoll
v. Stapleton,13 and the law was temporarily enjoined. As the first challenge
brought under Article II, section 13 as a standalone provision, Driscoll
presented the Montana Supreme Court with its first opportunity to define
the analytical framework applicable to Montana’s right-of-suffrage provision.14 While the Court declined to set forth a formal test for right-of-suffrage litigation at this stage of the proceedings,15 Driscoll encapsulates the
debate raging in Montana and around the country over how to balance the
right to vote against the legislature’s ability to regulate elections.16 In doing
so, it demonstrates the steep precipice upon which Montana teeters; if it
steps too far in one direction, the right to vote may narrow beyond recognition.
This Note begins in Part II with a brief discussion of the historical
meaning of the right-of-suffrage provision. It then sets forth the framework
8. Id. at 388–89. In 2018, Montana voters approved the Assistance Ban as Legislative Referendum
129. 2018 General Election, MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, https://perma.cc/X8K3-G4LK (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-703 (2019).
10. Id. § 13-35-704.
11. Id. § 13-35-705.
12. H.B. 530, 67th Leg., § 2, (Mont. 2021).
13. 473 P.3d 386 (Mont. 2020).
14. Hannah Tokerud, The Right of Suffrage in Montana: Voting Protections Under the State Constitution, 74 MONT. L. REV. 417, 427 (2013).
15. Driscoll, 473 P.3d at 393.
16. See, e.g., Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020) (granting certiorari); Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020); Priorities USA v.
Missouri, 591 S.W.3d 448 (Mo. 2020); Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights
Illuminated by the COVID-19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 263
(2020).
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devised by the United States Supreme Court to analyze election challenges
and explores how that test fails to adequately protect Montana’s right-ofsuffrage. Part III discusses the legislative background of the Assistance Ban
and the Court’s decision in Driscoll. Finally, Part IV analyzes the application of strict scrutiny to the Assistance Ban and suggests how Montana’s
free and open right-of-suffrage can be best protected by courts in the future.
II. STATE

AND

FEDERAL RIGHTS

TO

VOTE

A. State Constitutional Foundations
Montana’s Constitution—ratified in 1972—adopted its right-of-suffrage provision verbatim from the 1884 Montana Constitution.17 The provision, from its roots in the 1876 Colorado Constitution to its modern 1972
incarnation, has slept quietly in the background, passing through the years
with remarkably little discussion to flesh out its contours.18 Because courts
and litigants have only rarely discussed Montana’s right-of-suffrage provision,19 the technical contours and conflicts inherent in a voting rights challenge have yet to be mapped out. However, while the provision has indeed
slept quietly, it has not slept silently, and we are not left entirely without a
guide to understand its meaning.
Transcripts from the 1889 Montana Constitutional Convention provide
some guidance as to the meaning of “free” and “open” in Article II, section
13.20 As Hannah Tokerud found in an earlier study of Montana’s right-ofsuffrage, “open” likely describes the accessibility of the voting process, that
elections are “in public, free to everybody, and open to everybody,” while
“free” likely refers to voting without cost or restraint.21 Delegate Vermillion
captured the breadth of this right during the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention when he stated, “the act of voting is not a privilege that the
state merely hands out but is a basic right—a right that in no way should be
infringed unless for very good reasons.”22 These “very good reasons” refer
to the viable restraints on the right of suffrage listed in Article IV of the
Montana Constitution,23 such as the legislature’s delegated authority to set
voter age qualifications.24
17. MONT. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1884) (superseded by MONT. CONST. art. II, § 13 (1972)).
18. Tokerud, supra note 14, at 418.
19. Id. at 425 (identifying only nine Montana cases citing Article II, section 13 of the Montana
Constitution).
20. Id. at 418.
21. Id. at 420–21.
22. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 1237.
23. Tokerud, supra note 14, at 421.
24. MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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Among the most relevant restraints on voting rights in Montana are
those listed in Article IV, section 3: “The legislature shall provide by law
the requirements for residence, registration, absentee voting, and administration of elections. It may provide for a system of poll booth registration,
and shall insure the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the electoral process.”25 Thus, a conflict begins to take shape as Article II’s expansive “free and open” right of suffrage naturally clashes with these Article IV
provisions facilitating election regulation.26
Poll booth registration regulations provide an excellent example of the
cross-textual tension between the two provisions. Near the turn of the 20th
century, as the population grew and poll workers were increasingly unable
to “personally recognize voters,” a purported concern with preventing fraud
spurned changes in the laws governing elections.27 What began as a simple
system of poll-booth registration involving checklists of electors over time
morphed into modern voter-ID laws28 with the potential to disenfranchise
tens of thousands in exchange for a negligible reduction in fraud.29
However, the delegates of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention recognized the danger in allowing a mere concern with fraud to justify
any system of poll-booth registration, whether checklists or voter-ID laws.
While discussing his proposal to enshrine the existing voter registration requirements in Article IV, Delegate Vermillion stated that “those who want
to maintain the present registration system must prove that there is a great
chance of fraud in the state of Montana . . . We are assuming that the voters
of Montana are innocent until proven guilty.”30 Delegate Champoux supported the proposal, calling the existing laws, which often resulted in eligible voters being removed from voting lists without their consent or notification, a “waste of time, effort, and money” after witnessing eligible voters
turned away at polling booths.31
Delegate McKeon provided the strongest rebuke of burdensome election legislation. Referencing registration laws enacted to suppress the vote
of southern black citizens, he proclaimed that “registration has been the
greatest factor in subverting the turnout of the American electorate in the
history of our country,” as suppressed voter turnout undermined democracy
25. MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
26. Douglas, supra note 2, at 135–36.
27. JAMES GRADY, SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS 74–75 (Mont. Constitutional Convention Comm’n,
Constitutional Convention Study No. 11 (1971)).
28. Tokerud, supra note 14, at 424–25.
29. Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 634–35 (2007).
30. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 1238.
31. Id. at 1239.
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itself.32 Delegate McKeon then provided a dire, yet prescient, warning: “If
we are to have a true participatory democracy, we must ensure that as many
people as possible vote for the people who represent them . . . The voter
registration laws . . . have effectively prevented so many people from voting
that we cannot say that we have a truly representative democracy.”33
These delegates’ statements evince the absolute primacy of Montana’s
right of suffrage provision and shed light on the values imbedded in our
democracy. Under the Montana Constitution, voting must be accessible,
free of costs, unrestrained, and widely exercised, except for when restraints
are patently necessary for effective election administration.
B. The Federal Framework
In many voting rights cases, whether brought in state or federal court,
judges default to the Burdick v. Takushi34 framework created by the Supreme Court.35 Known as the Burdick balancing test, this framework is the
dominant test employed by courts in election administration cases.36 When
evaluating a state election law challenge using the Burdick test, a court
must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .” against “the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by
its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make
it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”37

A court determines the severity of the burden and then applies the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to the law. Severe burdens receive strict scrutiny while “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” receive intermediate
or rational basis scrutiny.38
In practice, the Burdick test has proven to be a malleable standard eager to absorb the prejudices of its wielders.39 Applying Burdick, one court
upheld a burdensome election law when it merely disenfranchised a small
number of voters,40 while another court upheld a statute disenfranchising a
larger swath of voters because it was applied neutrally to all citizens.41
32. Id. at 1240–41. Delegate McKeon noted the registration laws succeeded in decreasing turnout
from eighty-two percent in 1874 to forty-eight percent in 1924. Id. at 1240.
33. Id. at 1240–41.
34. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
35. Hasen, supra note 16, at 272.
36. Douglas, supra note 2, at 98.
37. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
38. Id.
39. Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of
Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1055–64 (2009).
40. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2009).
41. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008).
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Cases have turned on the price and difficulty of obtaining a state ID,42 the
burden of producing certain documents for voter registration,43 the reliability of the postal service,44 and whether it was reasonable to require in-person voting during a pandemic.45 Yet in each case, courts asked plaintiffs to
demonstrate a law struck a sufficiently heavy blow to their voting rights to
justify the deeper examination of the law itself.46 In doing so, courts assumed a blow must be struck.
The Burdick test, in prioritizing inquiries into a statute’s harm, places
the wrong interests on the scales, resulting in an imbalanced right of suffrage. The root cause of this error is inherent in the test itself: Under the
Burdick framework, courts first analyze the severity of the burden and then
determine and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny.47 Accordingly, this
analytical structure places a high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs, often resulting in a devaluing and underenforcement of the right to vote.48 Further,
once a court concludes a state law constitutes a reasonable burden on the
voters’ rights, “it will be presumptively valid, since . . . normally [it] will be
counterbalanced by the very state interests” that prompted the law.49 In
other words, if a plaintiff is unable to convincingly demonstrate the existence of a severe burden imposed by the voting restriction, then a state
legislature’s rationale for enacting the law escapes thorough examination,
and laws suppressing voting rights are upheld.50 Although the United States
Supreme Court calls the right to vote fundamental,51 this deference to state
legislatures narrows the right and portrays a disregard for the freedom.52
Therefore, when a state with an explicit right-of-suffrage provision in
its constitution adopts the Burdick test, it risks impeding “a state court’s
ability to provide the heightened level of protection that . . . provision . . .
demands.”53 To preserve and faithfully observe an express right-of-suffrage, a state court should therefore turn to its own constitutional text and
structure for guidance.
42. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d
444, 447–48 (2007).
43. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2007).
44. Texas League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2020).
45. Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 617 (7th Cir. 2020).
46. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
47. Id. at 441. In Burdick, first the court determined Hawaii’s prohibition of write-in voting constituted a slight burden on voting rights. Id. at 439. Next, the court determined the ban was justified by
Hawaii’s legitimate interest in avoiding “unrestrained factionalism” and “party raiding.” Id. at 440–41.
48. Douglas, supra note 2, at 99.
49. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441.
50. Douglas, supra note 2, at 98–99.
51. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
52. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
143, 152 (2008).
53. Douglas, supra note 2, at 124.
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C. The Right-of-Suffrage in Montana Case Law
The Montana Supreme Court avoids “lock-stepping” with the United
States Supreme Court when the Montana Constitution provides a right absent in the federal Constitution.54 In contrast to the federal Constitution, the
Montana Constitution grants an explicit right-of-suffrage, located in Article
II, while simultaneously delegating to the legislature control over specific
aspects of the electoral process in Article IV.55 Therefore, under Montana’s
constitutional structure, “the specific conferral of the right to vote comes
first, subject only secondarily to the legislature’s authority to regulate the
election process.”56 The central importance of Montana’s right to vote
strongly suggests that any legislation seeking to narrow the right must overcome a high burden to be upheld.57
Montana precedent, although sparsely discussing the right-of-suffrage
directly, confirms this structural primacy. Rights found in Article II’s Declaration of Rights are considered fundamental;58 therefore, the right to vote
is fundamental.59 While it remains uncertain what test the Montana Supreme Court will apply to voting regulations,60 laws abridging fundamental
rights must ordinarily pass strict scrutiny61 by demonstrating that they are
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.62 Importantly,
“demonstrating a compelling interest entails something more than simply
saying it is so.”63 The State must support its claim through competent evidence.64 Thus, Montana’s constitutional structure inverts the paradigm set
forth in Burdick by requiring the State to prove the law’s worthiness instead
of demanding the plaintiff to establish a complete denial of their right-ofsuffrage as an initial matter. Placing the burden on the State to satisfy a high
evidentiary standard is critical to accurately analyzing the competing inter54. State v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312, 316 (Mont. 1999).
55. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 13; MONT. CONST. art. IV.
56. Douglas, supra note 2, at 139; Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986).
In Butte Community Union, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the right of welfare found in Article
12, section 3 of the Montana Constitution. The Court held the right was not fundamental because it was
neither contained in Article II nor a right “without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would
have little meaning.” Nevertheless, the Court found welfare benefits deserved greater protection than
rational basis scrutiny “because the constitutional convention delegates deemed welfare to be sufficiently important to warrant reference in the Constitution.” Butte Cmty. Union, 712 P.2d at 1311.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Willems v. State, 325 P.3d 1204, 1210 (Mont. 2014) (holding the Article II right to vote—in
the context of redistricting—fundamental).
60. Tokerud, supra note 14, at 437–38.
61. Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 65 P.3d 576, 580 (Mont. 2003).
62. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996).
63. Id. (emphasis in original).
64. Id.
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ests contained in Article II and Article IV while maintaining the right-ofsuffrage provision’s structural centrality and constitutional teeth.65
III.

DRISCOLL V. STAPLETON

A. Legislative Background
In 2017, the Montana Legislature passed the Assistance Ban, which
voters subsequently approved as a legislative referendum in 2018. Senator
Albert Olszewski introduced the Assistance Ban after receiving reports
from voters concerned with ballot collectors’ behavior. In a legislative hearing, Senator Olszewski stated the law was designed to protect the integrity
of the election by bolstering “confidence in the election process.”66 In 2020,
ahead of the primary election, the Chair of the Montana Democratic Party
along with other interested organizations filed suit against the Montana Secretary of State, seeking a temporary and permanent injunction against enforcement of the Assistance Ban. The district court temporarily enjoined the
law, concluding the Plaintiffs made a prima facie case showing that the
Assistance Ban might unconstitutionally burden their right to vote under
Article II, section 13 of the Montana Constitution by suppressing voter
turnout.67
The State appealed the injunction, arguing the district court improperly
applied strict scrutiny to the Assistance Ban instead of the Burdick balancing test used in other federal and state jurisdictions.68 The State asserted
that under the Burdick test, strict scrutiny of the Assistance Ban was inappropriate because the law imposed a minimal burden on the right-of-suffrage as voters could still deliver their ballots in person, at a mailbox, or
through a family or friend.69 Further, the State argued the legislature had a
compelling interest in preventing voter fraud and intimidation that significantly outweighed the law’s minimal burden. Therefore, the lower court
erred in temporarily enjoining the law.70

65. Joshua A. Douglas, A Vote for Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court’s Severe Burden Test for
State Election Regulations That Adversely Impact an Individual’s Right to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
372, 390 (2007).
66. Driscoll v. Stapleton, 473 P.3d 386, 388–89 (Mont. 2020).
67. Id. at 388.
68. Appellant Corey Stapleton’s Opening Brief at 12–13, Driscoll v. Stapleton, 473 P.3d 386
(Mont. 2020) (No. DA 20-0295).
69. Id. at 28.
70. Id. at 30, 36.
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B. Majority
In the majority opinion written by Justice Baker, the Court affirmed
the district court’s preliminary injunction against the Assistance Ban, finding that the Plaintiffs satisfied their evidentiary burden of showing that the
law would likely infringe on their right-of-suffrage under Article II, section
13 the Montana Constitution.71 The Court determined that the Plaintiffs
demonstrated a prima facie case that the Assistance Ban would negatively
impact voter turnout among certain sub-groups who rely on ballot collection, “including: senior and disabled voters . . . first-time student voters . . .
working students, working parents, or low-wage workers . . . .”72 In particular, the law disproportionately burdened Native American voters who face
immense obstacles to cast a vote, including living great distances from polling places, high costs of transportation, shared P.O. boxes, and slower mail
services.73
Along with the negative impacts on voter enfranchisement, the Court
discussed the lack of evidentiary support for the State’s position on voter
fraud.74 To this point, the Court held that the State’s unsubstantiated
claims—that the Assistance Ban prevented voter fraud and guarded against
abuses of the electoral process while access to alternative voting methods
remained “equally available to all voters”—failed to rebut the Plaintiffs’
fact-based argument showing a real, quantifiable impact on the ability of
certain groups to exercise their right to vote.75 In fact, the record was utterly
devoid of evidence supporting the State’s position.76 Because the Plaintiffs
demonstrated the Assistance Ban burdened the constitutional right-of-suffrage, while the State could not proffer a cognizable interest weighing in its
favor, the Court held that the district court properly enjoined the Assistance
Ban.77
C. Dissent
Justice Sandefur’s special concurrence dissented from the Court’s conclusion as to the Assistance Ban.78 Justice Sandefur, joined by Justice Rice,
disagreed with the majority that the Plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated
71. Driscoll, 473 P.3d at 393.
72. Id. at 389, 393–94.
73. Id. at 389. Before the Assistance Ban, ballot collection organizations facilitated the pooling and
delivery of ballots on behalf of many Native Americans. These organizational efforts helped increase
Native American turnout by 7,704 individuals from 2014 to 2018. Id. at 390.
74. Id. at 393–94.
75. Id. at 392–94.
76. Id. at 393.
77. Id. at 393–94.
78. Id. at 395.
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harm to their constitutional voting rights, stating that instead the record was
“devoid of any substantial non-speculative evidence” that the law might
directly cause a decrease in absentee voting.79 Justice Sandefur first suggested that the Assistance Ban imposed no “burden on the right of [any]
specific class of Montanans to vote” before going on to say that the Montana Constitution did not provide the right to vote in “the most convenient”
manner possible.80 Justice Sandefur then argued the State need not offer
particular evidence supporting a compelling interest; rather, a compelling
state interest could be implied merely from the Assistance Ban’s “manifest
purposes . . . ‘to prevent voter fraud, protect voters from harassment . . . and
protect public integrity in the elections.’”81
Justice Sandefur then addressed the State’s position that the perception
of political corruption, along with actual corruption, is a compelling interest.82 He noted the Montana Supreme Court has recognized the value in
avoiding the appearance of corruption to maintain “the integrity of and public confidence in the electoral process and protecting against the risk of
voter fraud.”83 Accordingly, Justice Sandefur would not require the government to provide evidence that the law was truly necessary, nor the least
restrictive means of furthering the State’s interest, and would evaluate the
Assistance Ban’s constitutionality using the standard of intermediate scrutiny as announced by the United States Supreme Court, which he suggests
is equivalent to the federal Burdick test.84
IV.

ANALYSIS

AND

APPLICATION

Decades of voting rights cases have helped develop a robust body of
law concerning election integrity, voter participation rates, balancing tests,
and the proper powers of state legislatures.85 In Driscoll, the threads of
these discussions make their first appearance in Montana against a back79. Id. at 395, 398–400 (Sandefur, J., dissenting in part). Justice Sandefur criticized the Affidavit of
Kenneth Mayer, Ph.D, which analyzed the statistical data of Montana elections and found the Assistance
Ban would decrease turnout. Justice Sandefur suggested the affidavit did not provide a sufficiently
robust causal link between the law and voter turnout. He criticized evidence showing the law would
exacerbate poor voter turnout on Native American reservations on the same grounds, suggesting voter
turnout rates moved independent of efforts by ballot collection organizations to increase the rates of
returned ballots.
80. Id. at 400 (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 402.
82. Id. at 400–02.
83. Id. at 402. The dissent refers to Montana Auto Association v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300 (Mont.
1981), where the Montana Supreme Court held unconstitutional a ballot initiative that required public
disclosure of money spent on lobbyists. Greely was not brought under Article II, section 13.
84. Id. at 404–05.
85. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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drop of sharply increased interest in state voting regulations. The majority’s
focus on both the State’s lack of evidence and the extensive burdens placed
on voters by the Assistance Ban—particularly Native American voters—
suggests the Court will ultimately disregard the Burdick framework and instead apply strict scrutiny in a continuation of its fundamental rights precedent.86 Nevertheless, the dissent’s reasoning provides a useful example of
the pitfalls and flaws inherent in applying a balancing test to the fundamental right-of-suffrage.87
The following Subsections discuss how strict scrutiny avoids these pitfalls and then apply strict scrutiny to the Assistance Ban to demonstrate
how it protects Montana’s expansive commitment to voting rights enshrined
in its Constitution.
A. Scrutiny
While the majority declined to formally announce Montana’s test for
right-of-suffrage challenges brought under Article II, section 13 of the
Montana Constitution,88 the Court’s precedent strongly supports applying
strict scrutiny,89 as does the structural primacy of the provision in the Constitution. Because the Burdick balancing test places an inappropriately high
evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to show a severe infringement of their voting rights, it distorts values implicit in Montana’s constitutional structure.
Justice Sandefur’s dissent demonstrates the consequences of applying
this distorted balancing test while also crediting the State’s bare assertion of
a compelling interest.90 Justice Sandefur first rejected affidavits submitted
by the Plaintiffs showing the likelihood of the Assistance Ban’s negative
impact on voter turnout. He criticized a political scientist’s affidavit based
on statistical modelling because it did not prove a direct link between the
Assistance Ban and a decrease in anticipated voter turnout. Similarly, he
disregarded evidence provided by voting rights organizations, calling it anecdotal speculation that failed to show the Assistance Ban would “cause . . .
any significant decrease in absentee voter turnout . . . .”91 Based on these
perceived weaknesses, Justice Sandefur determined the Plaintiffs failed to
meet their evidentiary burden.92 Next, he argued the State need not “make a
86. Driscoll, 473 P.3d at 386, 393–94.
87. Id. at 404–05 (Sandefur, J., dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 386, 393 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 392 (discussing the application of strict scrutiny “when a statute implicates a fundamental
right found in the Montana Constitution’s declaration of rights”); Finke v. State ex rel. McGrath, 65 P.3d
576, 580 (Mont. 2003) (identifying strict scrutiny as an appropriate test in election litigation).
90. Driscoll, 473 P.3d at 403–04 (Sandefur, J., dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 398–400.
92. Id. at 400.
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formal evidentiary showing of a compelling state interest” if, for example,
the law’s stated purpose is recognized as important by a state authority.93
Because the Assistance Ban was allegedly enacted to prevent voter fraud,
and Article IV, section 3 recognizes the need to “insure the purity of elections,” Justice Sandefur argued the Montana Constitution recognized the
law’s purpose as important. Accordingly, he would not require the State to
prove a compelling interest in enacting the law.94
Requiring direct causal proof from the Plaintiffs to protect their rightof-suffrage while crediting the State’s unsupported generalities in support
of its Article IV powers elevates Article IV’s legislative directives above
Article II’s fundamental right-of-suffrage, thereby devaluing the constitutional meaning and force behind Montana’s free and open elections provision. Conversely, strict scrutiny properly prioritizes the right to free, open,
and ubiquitous voting by upholding infringements on that right only when
the State proves the specific infringement is narrowly tailored to effectuate
a patent compelling state interest.
The ability to conveniently cast one’s ballot is included within the
right to free and open voting. Indeed, Justice Sandefur’s assertion that the
Montana Constitution does not provide the right to vote in “the most convenient” manner possible wholly misrepresents what types of harm to the
right-of-suffrage are granted constitutional significance.95 Because widespread participation is essential to a functioning democracy, laws decreasing voter turnout threaten our democratic cohesion.96 As Justice Brandeis
stated, “a fundamental principle of the American government” is “that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”97 Therefore, it is critical to
recognize decreased voter turnout and the erection of additional barriers as
constitutional harms.98 While the Montana legislature may regulate elections,99 the right-of-suffrage granted in Article II, section 13 has absolute
93. Id. at 401–02. “A compelling government interest may be manifestly implied from the language
and effect of an enactment; judicial notice of precedent from other jurisdictions recognizing a compelling government interest in similar legislation; or judicial notice of a related manifest government interest in preventing corruption of the political process, preserving the integrity of essential government
processes, or furthering the protection or exercise of individual rights.” Id. at 401 (citing Mont. Auto.
Ass’n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 303–04 (Mont. 1981) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 402.
95. Id. at 400.
96. Overton, supra note 29, at 657–58. Overton states that widespread participation serves four
purposes: “First, it exposes decision-makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints . . . Second, [it] allows
the people, as a whole, to check the power of government officials who might otherwise enact . . .
abusive practices . . . Third, [it] allows for a redistribution of government resources and priorities to
reflect evolving problems and needs. Finally, [it] furthers self-fulfillment and self-definition of individual citizens who play a role in shaping the decisions that affect their lives.” Id. at 657.
97. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
98. Overton, supra note 29, at 674.
99. MONT. CONST. art. IV.
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primacy. Because Montana voters’ right to free and open voting embraces
the ability to conveniently cast a ballot, any barriers erected by the Assistance Ban have central constitutional significance.
B. Evidentiary Standard Required to Demonstrate a Compelling State
Interest
Strict scrutiny’s requirement that the State provide a compelling interest in enacting a law guards the right-of-suffrage provision behind an evidentiary fence.100 To surmount this threshold evidentiary burden, a state
must provide hard data demonstrating the law “is consistent with” Article
IV’s “specific conferral of legislative power to regulate elections.”101 Without such concrete factual support, claims of fraud and nebulous interests in
preserving election purity act as kindling, stoking partisan divides. In fact,
regulations justified by these baseless claims heighten voters’ perceptions
of fraud without any corresponding increase in systemic trust.102 To protect
both the integrity of the electoral system and the right-of-suffrage, courts
should deem election regulations presumptively invalid if the State cannot
supply direct evidence for its claims.103
Judges, legislators, and humans generally, frequently misperceive risk
because stereotypes, emotion, and other lived experiences skew their perceptions. Mere anecdotes of voter fraud “mislead us into thinking we know
things that anecdotes simply cannot teach us.”104 Hard data improves the
consistency and reasoning of court opinions by quelling these assumptions,
thereby limiting “ad hoc, contestable conjecture about the danger of fraud”
and “flowery language to declare a law “necessary to improve voter confidence.”105 It dampens the instinct to reach for “vague state interest[s]” as
“makeweight constitutional argument[s].”106
Thus, the failure to require hard data in support of allegations of voter
fraud can lead to unsound decisions that disenfranchise voters. As an example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,107 the United States
Supreme Court found that a voter-ID law’s claimed effect of preventing
fraud—despite no evidence of actual voter fraud having occurred in Indiana—constituted a significant state interest because it increased public trust
100. Douglas, supra note 2, at 121.
101. Id. at 138–39.
102. Charles Stewart III, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Revisiting Public Opinion on
Voter Identification and Voter Fraud in an Era of Increasing Partisan Polarization, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1455, 1480–81, 1483 (2016).
103. Douglas, supra note 2, at 141.
104. Overton, supra note 29, at 645, 652.
105. Id. at 631, 665.
106. Stewart, Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 102, at 1483.
107. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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in elections.108 However, there is “no relationship between the existence of
. . . [a voter] ID law and greater voter confidence or voter turnout.” The law
needlessly erected a barrier to voting based on illogical, spectral justifications which posed actual threat to state elections. The voter-ID law disenfranchised voters to allegedly increase trust; however, perceptions of voter
fraud “have deeper ideological or political roots which remain unaffected
by a state’s election law regime.”109
The Ninth Circuit recently summarized these political roots underlying
voter fraud perceptions when it held:
. . . [I]f some Arizonans today distrust third-party [absentee] ballot collection, it is because of the fraudulent . . . efforts to persuade Arizonans that
third-party ballot collectors have engaged in election fraud. To the degree
that there has been any fraud, it has been the false and race-based claims of
the [bill’s] proponents. It would be perverse if those proponents, who used
false statements and race-based innuendo to create distrust, could now use
that very distrust to further their aims in this litigation.110

Allowing false perceptions of election fraud to justify onerous election regulations invites malevolent actors to propagate those very falsehoods, impermissibly prioritizing a specter over enfranchising citizens. Such regulations are doubly inappropriate when a state has a history of ballot collection
without fraud, and “fraud is already illegal under existing [state] law.”111
The inquiry should be “intensely local,” and made in the context of a state’s
specific voting history, constitution, and with the benefit of hard data, if
any, to support claims of fraud or illegality.112
Applying these standards to Montana, the State may satisfy its threshold evidentiary burden if it can provide hard data of actual cases of fraud in
Montana. However, the State cannot satisfy its burden in Driscoll because
fraud remains inexistent in Montana. Although over 73 percent of Montana
voters cast an absentee ballot in the 2018 general election, not one case of
absentee ballot fraud was uncovered.113 With no proof of fraud occurring
throughout Montana’s “established and well used absentee system,” the
State cannot justify the Assistance Ban as a tool to ensure a fair election.114
108. Id. at 197.
109. Stewart, Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 102, at 1460.
110. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1037 (9th Cir. 2020) cert. granted.
111. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 948 F.3d at 1045.
112. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78 (1986) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
769–70 (1973)).
113. Intervenors Western Native Voice, Montana Native Vote, Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort
Peck, Blackfeet Nation, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Crow Tribe and Fort Belknap Indian
Community’s Answer Brief at 6, 21, Driscoll v. Stapleton, 473 P.3d 386 (Mont. 2020) (No. DA 200295) [hereinafter “Intervenors”].
114. Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. Bullock, 491 F. Supp. 3d 814, 834 (D. Mont. Sept. 30, 2020).
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Additionally, Montana’s existing statutes prohibiting electoral fraud negate
the need or use for redundant and burdensome election regulations.115
C. Requirement of Narrow Tailoring
While the State’s argument in Driscoll should fail based on its inability
to show a compelling state interest, the Assistance Ban is similarly unnecessary because it is not “closely tailored to effectuate only that compelling
state interest” and it is not “the least onerous path” to do so.116 This prong
of strict scrutiny involves context-specific balancing of a law’s burdens
with its benefits and an examination of whether there is a “‘fit’ between the
state’s goals and the methods it has employed.”117 The constitutional mandate that elections be free and open—meaning accessible, free of cost, unrestrained, and widely exercised—should therefore guide this context-specific
analysis. Additionally, the analysis of voter costs should include indirect
expenses incurred by a voter that are not paid to the government, such as
travel costs and time loss.118 These indirect costs and barriers will be specific to Montana’s particular geography, demographics, and history.119
Applying these factors to the Assistance Ban demonstrates the discordance between the law’s impact on voter fraud and the actual anticipated
effects on Montana citizens. First, election regulations must be narrowly
adapted to Montana’s geography to increase accessibility and voter participation while reducing voter costs. Montana’s rural geography and voting
population are particularly served by the adoption of generous absentee voting methods.120 Ballot collection assists “senior and disabled voters who
may have trouble with transportation, standing in line, or the unavailability
of a caregiver to assist them.”121 Because of Montana’s size, in larger coun115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-214 (2019) (Illegal influence of voters); id. § 13-35-218 (Coercion
or undue influence of voters).
116. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996).
117. Douglas, supra note 52, at 199.
118. Ellis, supra note 39, at 1067. Ellis describes how indirect costs result in structural disenfranchisement, explaining “the voter who does not think that there is a benefit to participating and who
is, moreover, overwhelmed by the nature of the cost exacted, that person will be effectively excluded
from the electorate because that person will choose not to vote. This effect is sometimes called ‘structural disenfranchisement’. . . [which] has been defined as a complex interaction between the direct and
indirect costs exacted upon voters for participation in the electoral system.” Id. at 1035–36.
119. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1045 (9th Cir. 2020).
120. Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Who Makes Voting Convenient? Explaining the Adoption of Early and No-Excuse Absentee Voting in the American States, 15.2 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q.,
192–210 (2015).
121. Common Cause/Georgia League of Women Voters of Georgia, Inc. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d
1294, 1347 (N.D. Ga 2006) (concluding that “many voters who are elderly, disabled, or have certain
physical or mental problems simply cannot navigate that process or any long waits successfully”); Driscoll v. Stapleton, 473 P.3d 386, 389 (Mont. 2020).
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ties, many citizens travel long distances to reach their county seats.122 This
presents a serious barrier for Native Americans living on reservations, a
voting bloc disproportionately disenfranchised by restrictions on absentee
voting123 due in part to low rates of car ownership, a lack of mail services,
and long distances from polling places.124 As the Court in Driscoll describes:
. . . Native American voters as a group face significant barriers to voting:
many live far away from county elections offices and postal centers; many
have limited access to transportation; many have limited access to postal
services, lacking residential mailing services and using Post Office boxes
instead, which brings associated costs and travel; mail for those living on
reservations may take longer to reach its destination than for other voters in
the state; some reservations lack a uniform and consistent addressing system, which makes it difficult for residents to register to vote; and many
experience higher rates of poverty. Further, despite satellite voting locations
on some reservations, this requires tribes to submit annual written requests,
a significant administrative hurdle, and typically those locations still are located quite far from many Native American voters.125

To surmount these barriers, a majority of Montana voters cast absentee
ballots in elections.126 Indeed, absentee voting has become so ubiquitous
that “the method has transcended convenience and has become instead a
practical necessity.”127 Still, voters without access to mailboxes or who live
far from P.O. boxes struggle with absentee voting.128 Ballot collection organizations eliminate these remaining obstacles by collecting and delivering
ballots for voters. During the 2018 election, ballot collection organizations
increased turnout by conveying over 850 ballots on Native American reservations.129 Those 850 voters did not have to choose between paying for gas
or eating a meal, nor did they have to take a day off work to make the trip to
a polling station or P.O. Box to drop off their ballot. Of course, not all
barriers can be removed, and voting will always require a degree of economic sacrifice. However, any uncast vote—whether legally barred or leg122. Bordertown Discrimination in Montana 9, U.S. COMMISSION
https://perma.cc/U54Y-22AW.

ON

CIVIL RIGHTS (May 2019),

123. Mark Wandering Med. v. McCulloch, No. CV 12-135-BLG-DWM, 2014 WL 12588302, at *5
(Mont. Dist. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014) (finding poverty and limited vehicle access made in person voting
difficult for residents of three reservations).
124. Securing Indian Voting Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1738–40 (2016).
125. Driscoll, 473 P.3d at 390.
126. Absentee Turnout 2000-Present, supra note 5; Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. Bullock, 491
F. Supp. 3d 814, 822 (D. Mont. 2020).
127. Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 456 (2019).
128. Obstacles at Every Turn: Barriers to Political Participation Faced by Native American Voters,
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND 34, 40–41, 91, 113 (2020) https://perma.cc/KYN9-QUSQ.
129. Intervenors, supra note 113, at 9.
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islatively discouraged—harms the ideal of a robust democracy supported by
widespread electoral participation.130
Because of Montana’s geography and demographics, as well as the
ubiquitous use of absentee voting, the Court in Driscoll found the Assistance Ban would exacerbate barriers for Native Americans, the elderly and
disabled, the indigent, students, and caregivers, resulting in “unequal access
to the polls.”131 Despite these barriers, the Assistance Ban could be considered narrowly tailored if it targeted and prevented actual fraud and improved the integrity of Montana’s elections.
But the Assistance Ban provides no benefit to voters. Not only is the
law impotent in preventing Montana’s non-existent ballot collection
fraud,132 the law also negatively impacts traditional in-person voting. By
forcing ballot collectors to register with election personnel when delivering
ballots, wait times are increased for all voters, causing “delays [with] ripple
effects.”133 Because the Assistance Ban suppresses the right to vote in Montana while providing no benefit in increasing election integrity, it fails both
prongs of strict scrutiny and should be held to unconstitutionally burden
Montana’s free and open right-of-suffrage.
V. CONCLUSION
Preserved in Montana’s free and open elections provision is the constitutional right to cast a ballot without restraint or the imposition of unnecessary costs. The structural primacy of the right-of-suffrage demands that
strict scrutiny be applied in challenges to election regulations. Courts
should place the evidentiary burden on the State to prove an election regulation’s necessity through actual evidence specific to the realities of life in
Montana. Further, in close cases, the balance should always tip in favor of
“a citizen in the exercise of the right to vote,”134 because widespread participation is a critical component of a robust democracy. Barriers erected to
curtail free and open voting create a stark—though invisible—divide in society between those with a voice and those without that is “antithetical to a
coherent theory of democracy.”135

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Ellis, supra note 39, at 1033.
Driscoll v. Stapleton, 473 P.3d 386, 393 (Mont. 2020).
Donald J. Trump for Pres., Inc. v. Bullock, 491 F. Supp. 3d 814, 822 (D. Mont. 2020).
Common Cause/New York v. Brehm, 432 F. Supp. 3d 285, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
Stackpole v. Hallahan, 40 P. 80, 85 (Mont. 1895).
Ellis, supra note 39, at 1065.
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